Among the modes of violence inflicted by Israel on the Gaza Strip in the aggression that followed the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, three had specific spatial dimensions of humanitarian implications. The first was the perpetual mass displacement of most of the Palestinian population in Gaza while leaving them exposed in precarious encampments without basic protections. The second was the vast destruction of Gaza, including the encompassing spaciocide of infrastructures, agriculture, and entire urban and residential areas, making them completely uninhabitable. The third was the destruction of the existing well-spread humanitarian system and the creation of a small number of concentrated lethal spaces of aid distribution, forcing Gazans to choose between starvation and death by live fire. These forms have together stripped Gaza of its ability to provide basic conditions needed for life, leaving its Palestinian residents exposed to unprecedented levels of genocidal violence.
These linked forms of spatial violence were already manifested in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement on the day of October 7, threatening that “all of the places which Hamas is deployed, hiding and operating in … we will turn them into rubble,” while recommending Gaza’s residents to “leave now because we will operate forcefully everywhere.”1 For more than two years, the military violence unleashed following the attack on Israel has been unprecedently aggressive throughout the Strip. The UN reports more than 67,000 people have been killed in the Strip, the vast majority of them civilians, with more than 236,000 people—beyond 10 percent of Gaza’s population—killed or injured, of which at least 64,000 are children.2 Studies indicate, however, that the death toll of people killed by traumatic injuries has been significantly underreported by more than 40 percent, and many more deaths could be attributed to the level of destruction and prevention of aid, including induced famine, severe shortages of water, shelter, and life-sustaining infrastructures and health services caused by the war.3 Instead of being protected, civilians have been trapped in ongoing cycles of displacement, destruction, and death, unable to flee to safe places.
This genocidal campaign grasped every aspect of life in Gaza, forcing its residents to concentrate in ever-shrinking precarious areas described as “humanitarian zones” that lacked basic aid and were constantly attacked. The declared intention was to further concentrate Gazans in a “humanitarian city” and from there to push them to leave “voluntarily” to a third country. The Strip’s ethnic cleansing, it was made clear, was how the war’s stated goal—to eliminate Hamas—was planned to be achieved.4
This stripping of Gaza comprised Israel’s most systematic ethnic erasure of the Palestinians since the Nakba. It formed part of the state’s longstanding settler colonial structure of promoting the expansion of the Israeli-Jewish settler society while eliminating, expelling, and shrinking the space of Palestinians. This time, however, the intentionality of the mass killing has been brought to another level, with declarations by government ministers that there are no “innocents or uninvolved people” in Gaza, the same view held by 62 percent of the Israeli public.5 On the ground, soldiers claimed that the army’s approach was that “everyone is a terrorist,” while others sang dehumanizing and messianic phrases that justified the killing of civilians.6
The elimination of Palestinians and Palestine had also expanded to areas beyond the Strip, with drastic increases in state-backed settler violence, military operations, and governmental policies of movement restrictions and expansionist settlement plans designed to permanently displace Palestinians in the West Bank. Israel’s strikes on five other countries in the region—Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, and Qatar—though justified as pre-emptive eradication of security threats, were also about targeting negotiations and diplomatic efforts to end the war. At the same time, the state of Israel has forced the Israeli communities displaced by the October 7 Hamas attack to return and re-settle their kibbutzim during the war, even as the violence just across the border might have exacerbated their own experiences of trauma and loss.
The territorial aspirations and genocidal nature of the war were clearly revealed through these actions of spatial violence, which included the cynical use of humanitarian lexicons and practices for the enhancement of Israel’s expansionist, settler colonial structure. The October 2025 ceasefire agreement has halted the messianic aspirations of re-settling in Gaza from becoming an immediate reality, yet there are already indications that pressing the Palestinians into ever-shrinking enclaves in the Strip and beyond will continue by other means.
This is the territorial logic that enabled the Israeli spatial modes of violence that turned Gaza into a sealed wasteland of rubble where no life could exist without aid, and where basic humanitarian support has continued to be used as a bargaining chip even after the ceasefire deal.7 It shows what could easily happen again if a real political shift does not accompany the fragile and transitional arrangements for the rebuilding of the Strip. Rather than being part of broader Palestinian political and physical landscape that is necessary for Gaza’s viable future, the Strip’s rebuilding might become a large administrative and construction project on a detached territorial island, one which is exposed to new forms of occupation, possession, and dispossession.
Between Perpetual and Permanent Displacement
Repeating enforced displacement to unsafe areas was exercised from the first day of the war. Almost all of the 2.3 million Palestinians in the Strip have been displaced repeatedly, some over ten times.8 Humanitarian zones in the Strip designated by the Israeli army were constantly changing and shrinking in size, with evacuation and militarized zones covering more than 88 percent of the Strip, meaning that more than two million people were squeezed into less than forty-five square kilometers.9
Many of those displaced have tried to find refuge in the overcrowded tent camps of the so-called “humanitarian zones” created mostly in the southern part of the Strip on the dunes of al-Mawasi, with no sufficient aid of adequate shelter, water, food, and medicine. These displaced people’s camps were also constantly under attack. In the first weeks of the war, Israel routinely used its heaviest 2000-pound munitions at least 200 times in areas in South Gaza that it designated safe. In these exposed encampments, many civilians who were not killed by the targeted bombing were killed or seriously injured by the fire that quickly spread through the makeshift fabric, tarp, and timber shelters. These targeted attacks on humanitarian areas have continued throughout the war, and may amount not only to war crimes, but also to crimes against humanity.10
By keeping encampments exposed to direct military violence and starvation, and by preventing healthcare and aid, Israel rendered the “voluntary migration” of Palestinians not as ethnic cleansing, but as a humanitarian and moral approach that was, in the words of Netanyahu, “the right thing to do.”11 This, together with Trump and others' former plans that envision the “Gaza Riviera” after transferring its residents elsewhere, not only ignored Palestinian aspirations for self-determination but also blatantly dehumanized them as disposable entities that can be moved as cargo to where others see fit.12
Spaciocidal Destruction
Alongside the displacement of the Strip’s population, entire areas have been reduced to rubble. With Israel systematically leveling thousands of buildings and entire living environments, around 92 percent of homes in the Strip—the homes of over 1.8 million people—have been damaged or destroyed.13 Essential infrastructures were also destroyed or have collapsed, with less than a quarter of Gaza’s pre-war water supplies remaining available and the majority of the road network damaged.
This extent of spaciocidical violence, including urbicide and domicide—the widespread and deliberate destruction of housing and living environments—was justified by the Israeli military as part of their goal to destroy the “terror infrastructures” run by Hamas, while minimizing risk to Israeli soldiers.14 Yet this staggering and systematic destruction of homes and related deaths cannot be explained solely by such protectionist military objectives.
At the beginning of the war, the limit on the number of civilians the army could endanger in each strike was lifted to between 20 and 100 people.15 Israeli bombing campaigns have been directed throughout the war by AI and other automated systems such as Lavender and Where’s Daddy? These systems tend to identify targets when they are at home, and usually at night—when they are easily located, with their entire families around them. As one intelligence officer explained: “We were not interested in killing [Hamas] operatives only when they were in a military building or engaged in a military activity. On the contrary, the IDF bombed them in homes without hesitation, as a first option. It’s much easier to bomb a family’s home. The system is built to look for them in these situations.”16
The destruction of homes has been part of the systematic flattening of entire residential areas. Houses, and later whole neighborhoods, refugee camps, towns, and cities—first in the northern part of the Strip and later in the south—have been demolished to create military “buffer zones” and “corridors”—and also just for the sake of it. Soldiers’ videos show smiles, dances, and toasts celebrating acts of demolition and destruction, while testimonies share how soldiers discussed “ruining all of Gaza” and “wiping it out” as a legitimate idea.17
As the war progressed, civilian Israeli contractors were paid by the house to raze entire neighborhoods, making a profit from Gaza’s destruction, along with global firms.18 This spaciocidal campaign has been defined as one of the most expensive engineering projects in Israel’s history.19 Meanwhile, the demolished structures themselves create a deadly environment. Gaza’s rubble contains asbestos, widely used in past construction, which forms with its destruction a “very, very toxic environment.”20 Clearing the millions of tons of Gaza’s debris could yield 90,000 tons of greenhouse gas emissions, while leaving it in situ contaminates the land, water, and air.21
The approach towards the Strip has been consistent throughout the war. It was not only expressed by Netanyahu and his far-right government, but also by central figures such as Giora Eiland, the former head of the Israeli National Security Council, who declared that “the state of Israel has no choice but to turn Gaza into a place that is temporarily or permanently impossible to live in. Creating a severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza is a necessary means to achieve the goal.”22
Despite the military reasoning of Gaza’s catastrophic destruction, there was justifiable concern that Israel’s endgame in Gaza might include the return of settlers. Far-right finance minister Bezalel Smotrich claimed that “without [Israeli] settlements [in the Gaza Strip], there is no security,” and that the Strip, as part of his messianic agenda, is “part of the Land of Israel.” Far-right national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, meanwhile, promised a neighborhood for Israeli police officers in Gaza.23
Furthermore, settler leaders have visited the Strip’s closed military zone to scout potential locations for future settlements, and far-right activists have erected “practice settling encampments.”24 This has been accompanied by architectural imaginaries, when an Israeli real estate company that is a leader in building illegal settlements in the West Bank published an ad stating that “a house on the beach [of the Strip] is not a dream.”25 While describing it later as “wishful thinking,” its employees have documented themselves as reservists in Gaza on heavy equipment, appearing as if they were beginning construction there, further restating the link between military and civilian territorial aspirations and actions.26
Israeli spaciocidal responses to October 7 have not been limited to the Strip alone. Demolitions of Palestinian homes have increased since the beginning of the war in the West Bank and within Israel, with the vast destruction of entire areas and communities in Jenin, Tulkarem, South Hebron, and East Jerusalem, as well as a surge of over 400 percent in demolitions of Bedouin homes in the Negev.27 The sixty-nine bombs dropped from the air on the refugee camps in the northern West Bank since the start of the war have been accompanied by house demolitions and violent actions of destruction by Israeli settlers in the West Bank that have together displaced more than 40,000 Palestinians there, with more than 960 people killed as a result of military and settler violence.28 The recent governmental approval given for an enormous settlement project in the controversial E1 zone—which would divide the West Bank in two while cutting it off from East Jerusalem—does not just aim to reduce Palestinian space while expanding Jewish Israeli space, but to do so in a way that would further split it and erase any chance for a Palestinian state or a continuous territory.29
Necro-Humanitarianism
Gaza, with its systematic destruction, was made into a camp-like territory where life cannot exist without external aid. At the same time, the Israeli government has been working to systematically dismantle the humanitarian aid systems working in the Strip, including the UN, other international agencies, and local entities. By completely outlawing the UN Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and blocking aid in early 2025 under the accusation that Hamas is taking over its distribution, the civilian aid system in Gaza has reached the point of collapse.30 In its place, Israel created a proxy organization—the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF)—which operated as a military-backed private contractor supported by the US to take over aid distribution in Gaza, and which has proven to be lethal.
Intending to replace the hundreds of aid distribution stations and community kitchens previously used to provide aid to more than two million people, the GHF has opened only four distribution points, three of which were placed in a small area southwest of Rafah. These “mega-sites” had tremendously short opening hours and distributed twenty-kilogram aid packs that only the capable and strong could carry, sometimes for up to six hours, to where they live. This left the weak and vulnerable—children, women, the elderly, the injured—with no ability to access aid.31 In one of these stations, named the Swedish Village, Palestinians were herded into dehumanizing and unprotected fenced lanes as they queued for aid.32
All these so-called humanitarian sites became death traps with the use of live fire to attempt to control the chaos of a starving population scrambling for food. Over 2,146 Palestinians were killed near GHF sites by the end of August 2025,33 with Israeli soldiers ordered to deliberately shoot unarmed Gazans waiting for aid say GHF distribution points have become “a killing field.”34 While civilians had no choice but to take a risk of being killed in these GHF sites or to die of starvation, the Israeli army and far-right protestors were preventing thousands of truckloads of aid from entering Gaza.35
A day before the GHF began operations in Gaza, on May 25, 2025, its American director resigned saying the organization could not adhere to basic humanitarian principles of “humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.”36 Indeed, humanitarian aid was weaponized by the Israeli government through this organization as a lethal instrument.37 This scheme was similar to a plan titled “The Gaza Humanitarian Islands” published in December 2024 by an organization of former Israeli military generals—Israel’s Defense and Security Forum (IDSF)—which proposed to take control of aid distribution and create “humanitarian zones” for Gaza’s internally displaced people.38 The plan suggested that international organizations will distribute aid, “effectively dismantling the distribution networks of UNRWA and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, guided by the principle: ‘The hand that distributes the aid is the hand that controls it’.”
Acknowledging the extensive destruction of built-up areas that became uninhabitable, the IDSF plan said that “it is currently neither feasible nor recommended that the internally displaced people (IDPs) return at the conclusion of the war.” It suggested using this situation to divide the Strip and create within each section an “IDP city” as a “humanitarian island,” which will be managed with the use of biometric certificates as a “separate temporary administrative territory” following the principle of “divide and rule.”
While the IDSF proposed a distribution of humanitarian sites throughout the Strip, the concentration of most of the GHF stations in the south had obvious territorial intentions. The accompanying Israeli governmental plan to concentrate Palestinians in a southern camp described as a “humanitarian city”—to be created on the ruins of Rafah near the Egyptian border—was a further step which used humanitarian terms for potential territorial purposes.39 The plan envisioned “moving” 600,000 displaced Palestinians residing in the makeshift encampments of the southern al-Mawasi area into the camp, and to eventually accommodate and confine the entire population of Gaza there. This camp, called a “humanitarian transit area,” was planned as an enclosed space to which Palestinians can only enter after a “security screening,” and once inside are not allowed to leave.
This de facto concentration and internment camp had a clear political and territorial meaning as a place of deportation, described in July 2025 by Israel’s defense minister, Israel Katz, as part of “the emigration plan, which will happen.”40 It reveals the cynical use of the language of aid to inflict harm, being neither a humanitarian site—which should be created as impartial and independent of political and territorial objectives—nor a city—which should form a habitable place that offers opportunities and human connections with a variety of possibilities for social, economic, and cultural life and the freedom to move around and outside of it. Rather, this “humanitarian city” was intended to form a space of confinement, from which Palestinians will be displaced outside the Strip. While this has been described by one of Israel’s leading human rights lawyers, Michael Sfard, as “an operational plan for a crime against humanity,” it was a continuation of the historical logic of camps in Palestine.41 Such camps were and still are used to concentrate and expel the Palestinians while spreading and settling the Israeli Jewish population over the territory, leaving their residents exposed to the decisions of those managing them from the outside.42
Israel’s Enforced Resettlement
The elimination of Gaza as a Palestinian space was seen as a response to the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, which resulted in the killing of about 1,200 people in Israel—including children, women, and the elderly—and the taking of more than 250 hostages, some of whom were held in Gaza for more than two years.43 The Hamas offensive also included the destruction of Israeli homes and residential areas, displacing around 64,000 people. In response to this, Israel formed a specific governmental organization to temporarily accommodate the displaced Israeli communities and to plan their rehabilitation. Named Tekuma (Hebrew for recovery, revival, or rebuilding), the organization released a document in April 2024 specifying a phased strategic five-year plan to rehabilitate the communities along the Gaza border, investing first in “healing and recovery” and then in “growth,” with a vision to “resettle the communities, renew and expand the settlement.”44
An earlier document of the Israeli Planning Authority, published in November 2023, presented an evaluation of international approaches to “rehabilitating disaster areas.”45 These include participatory consultations with affected communities and global precedents of recovery plans for settlements affected by disasters, such as those designed by the Chilean architectural practice Elemental. As part of their rehabilitation, displaced Israeli kibbutz members were mostly accommodated in the northern Negev along with their communities, with each family given a “caravilla”—a combination of a caravan and a villa.46 This was built on the recognition that a familiar sense of place and close social relationships, as well as the ability to maintain connections to the nearby environments from which these communities were displaced provides the first level of support. These temporary spaces are not dissimilar to temporary camps used by Israel in the past to absorb Jewish immigrants and also to accommodate settlers evicted from the Gaza Strip back in 2005.47 This is the first time, however, that such temporary environments were created for Israelis displaced by Palestinian violence, and the intention was to dedicate attention to the healing of their vulnerable residents.
Twenty months into the war, the Israeli government decided to terminate state funding for this and other forms of temporary housing, forcing residents back to their homes along the Gaza border. Kibbutz communities, however, struggled to think about their return when the war was continuing, and when some of their community members were still being held hostage in Gaza. As Lior Simcha, secretary-general of the Kibbutz Movement, said, without the return of the hostages, “there can be no rebuilding of the Gaza-border kibbutzim.” The Kibbutz Movement campaigned for a ceasefire deal that would bring back the hostages, while also recognizing that the war was devastating for people from both sides, who, as Simcha stressed, “will continue living side by side, even in the future.”48 The far-right Israeli government and activists, however, demonized the hostages’ families and those supporting them in their struggle to push for a deal, portraying them as supporters of Hamas.49 Instead, the state pushed for the continuation of the war together with the return of the kibbutz communities against their will, forcing them to “rebuild.”
In August 2025, the Israeli High Court of Justice decided to reject a petition filed by the residents of Nahal Oz against their forced return to their kibbutz during the war, which, they argued, is not safe and impacts their mental health and sense of security.50 The court, however, argued that this is not a legal dispute but a matter of governmental policy, and that it cannot enforce the state to provide support. As a result, the government was authorized to withdraw funding from kibbutz communities that objected the continuation of the war, employing a form of spatial violence against its own citizens while presenting an image within the country that the situation at the border was “back to normal” when the war was still ongoing. Israel’s settler colonial logic of shrinking and erasing Palestinian space while (re)settling the Jewish population was therefore enforced in different forms of explicit and implicit violence on both sides of the border.
Beyond the Palestinian Archipelago
The combination of the Israeli settler colonial structure with the most right-wing and messianic government Israel has ever known—together with the Hamas attack and the hostages who remained in Gaza for more than two years—has been devastating. For some in Israel, however, this combination was seen as an opportunity to reach an ethno-racial vision of cleansing Palestinians from their homeland while expanding the territorial hold of Israeli society, a sentiment reinforced by feelings of revenge and fear, AI technologies, and sheer messianic enthusiasm. The unprecedented military violence, combined with perpetual mass-displacement, systematic destruction of home environments, and necro-humanitarianism that kills rather than sustains, was a genocidal system designed to force Palestinians to leave their stripped land indefinitely.
Displacement, destruction, and the concentration of the Palestinians in ever-shrinking and fragmented territorial islands under the guise of “security needs” has always been part of the Israeli settler colonial spatial toolbox. Without the pressure of some countries to end the war, the mass displacement of the Gazans, the destruction of their living environments, and the deadly prevention of aid would have culminated in the settler colonial aim of eliminating Palestinians from the territory. Even without the genocidal expressions of politicians and military officials, the necro-humanitarian approach of the Israeli government clearly shows that the killing of uninvolved civilians was one of the undeclared aims of the war. Gaza, completely stripped—house by house, neighborhood by neighborhood, camp by camp, city by city—was considered by some far-right politicians as yet another stage of the “historical right” of Jews to settle the land, part of an ongoing overarching expansionist project conducted throughout the territory.51
With the October 2025 ceasefire deal, the war has seemingly ended, yet Trump’s “Gaza peace plan” does not offer a clear route to end the political situation that is at the root of this devastating reality.52 While Israeli and Hamas violence have nearly stopped and much-needed humanitarian aid begins to arrive, the plan’s suggested “Board of Peace” intends to temporarily govern Gaza as a “technocratic, apolitical” committee for the territory’s “redevelopment,” with only a blurred intent to establish an Israeli and Palestinian dialogue for a “political horizon” for peaceful co-existence beyond the destroyed enclave. This plan yet again envisions the Strip as a detached territorial island—one which is marketed for “investment proposals” as a grand project planned and supervised by international experts who are behind “some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East.”53
Instead of supporting what Trump calls a “strong, durable, and everlasting peace,” the reality on the ground seems to continue previous patterns of violence. While Hamas reasserts control of the Strip, Netanyahu—while praising the agreement—has also highlighted Trump’s past actions supporting Israel’s expansionism, including moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, and acknowledging Israel’s “rights in Judea and Samaria”—the occupied Palestinian West Bank.54
The Israeli territorial aspirations are further reflected in the responses to the ceasefire deal’s “yellow line” of the army’s withdrawal, a line that gives Israel control of about 53 percent of the Strip and already seen by some as “effectively the new border” with Gaza.55 Meanwhile, the opening of the US Central Command’s hub for Gaza—the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)— in Israel, and the establishment of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) to take control over the Strip’s security by multinational actors with questionable interests, indicate that the Palestinians might enter yet a new phase of fragmentation and subjugation to external governance.56 This seems to be a return to failing formulas of regional choreography conducted by international powers, rather than a plan leading a real political change.
If this is what follows the truce, without ongoing international pressure for a viable political solution—one that recognizes Palestinian agency and sovereignty that exceeds the current suffocating territorial Palestinian archipelago—the violence that stripped Gaza will continue by other settler colonial means until its next devastating eruption.
“Statement by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 7, 2023, ➝.
“Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip (7 October 2025),” OCHA, October 7, 2025, ➝; Julian Borger, “‘We Took the Gloves Off’: Ex-IDF Chief Confirms Gaza Casualties Over 200,000,” The Guardian, September 12, 2025, ➝; “Two years of hellish war have devastated Gaza’s children,” UNICEF, October 8, 2025, ➝; Tal Shalev and Eugenia Yosef, “More Than 10% of Gaza’s Population Has Been Killed or Injured, Former Israeli Military Chief Says,” CNN, September 15, 2025, ➝.
Zeina Jamaluddine et al., “Traumatic injury mortality in the Gaza Strip from Oct 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024: a capture–recapture analysis,” The Lancet 405, no. 10477 (February 2025): 469–77, ➝.
“Israel is in Talks to Possibly Resettle Palestinians from Gaza in South Sudan,” Associated Press, August 14, 2025, ➝.
Jason Burke and Daniel Boffey, “Israel limits aid into Gaza in dispute over hostage remains as ceasefire faces test,” The Guardian, October 14, 2025, ➝.
UNRWA Situation Report #150 on the Humanitarian Crisis in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, UNRWA, December 5, 2025, ➝.
“Humanitarian Situation Update #307 | Gaza Strip,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), July 23, 2025, ➝.
“Seven Attacks on Tent Encampments in the Past Two Weeks Kill 34 Palestinians Including 10 Children,” UN, December 6, 2024, ➝.
“Israel Is in Talks to Possibly Resettle Palestinians from Gaza in South Sudan,” Associated Press, August 14, 2025, ➝.
Peter Beaumont and Alice Speri, “‘Leaked ‘Gaza Riviera’ Plan Dismissed as ‘Insane’ Attempt to Cover Ethnic Cleansing,” The Guardian, September 1, 2025, ➝.
Garman et al., “Israel Levelling Thousands of Gaza Civilian Buildings.”
Patrick Kingsley et al., “Israel Loosened Its Rules to Bomb Hamas Fighters, Killing Many More Civilians,” The New York Times, December 26, 2024, ➝.
Yuval Abraham, “‘Lavender’: The AI Machine Directing Israel’s Bombing Spree in Gaza,” +972 Magazine, April 3, 2024, ➝.
Hagai Amit, “The Cost of Demolition: Gaza—Never in Israeli History Were So Many Buildings Leveled,” Haaretz, August 19, 2025, ➝.
Tom Bennett, “‘Very, Very Toxic’: The Risk of Asbestos in Gaza's Rubble,” BBC News, April 25, 2025, ➝.
Nina Lakhani, “Clearing Gaza Rubble Could Yield 90,000 Tonnes of Planet-heating Emissions,” The Guardian, July 22, 2025, ➝.
Patrick Wintour, Widespread Destruction in Gaza Puts Concept of ‘Domicide’ in Focus,” The Guardian, December 7, 2023, ➝.
Leonie Fleischmann, “Israel’s ‘Generals’ Plan’ to Clear Palestinians From North of Gaza Could Pave the Way for Settlers to Return,” The Conversation, October 25, 2024, ➝; Josh Breiner, “Far-right Minister Ben-Gvir Proposes Neighborhood for Israeli Police Officers in Gaza,” Haaretz, September 15, 2025, ➝.
Maya Rosen, המודעה שעוררה סערה: "בית על החוף בעזה", Mako, December 19, 2023, ➝.
“Israeli Real Estate Firm Pushes Settlement Building in Gaza,” posted December 19, 2023, by Al Jazeera, video, ➝.
“IDF Expands Military Raids in West Bank Using Bulldozers in Tulkarm,” posted January 29, 2025, by The Guardian, video, ➝; “Aftermath of Israeli Assault as Military Withdraws From West Bank’s Jenin,” Al Jazeera, September 6, 2024, ➝; “Demolitions in the South Hebron Hills and Jordan Valley, May–July 2024: 128 Structures Demolished on Authorities’ orders; 288 Palestinians, Including 112 Minors, Lose Their Homes,” posted September 4, 2024, by B’Tselem, video, ➝; “400% Surge in Demolition of Bedouin Homes in Negev,” Middle East Monitor, November 13, 2024, ➝.
David Gritten, “Israel Approves Controversial West Bank Settlement Project,” BBC News, August 20, 2025, ➝.
Yolande Knell, “Israel's Looming UNRWA Ban a Catastrophe, UN Palestinian Refugee Agency Warns,” BBC News, January 29, 2025, ➝.
Kaamil Ahmed et al., “Eleven-minute Race for Food: How Aid Points in Gaza Became ‘Death Traps’ – A Visual Story,” The Guardian, July 22, 2025, ➝.
“GHF opening hours make aid inaccessible,” Forensic Architecture, ➝.
UNRWA Situation Report #187 on the Humanitarian Crisis in the Gaza Strip and the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, UNRWA, September 5, 2025, ➝.
Nir Hasson, “‘It's a Killing Field’: IDF Soldiers Ordered to Shoot Deliberately at Unarmed Gazans Waiting for Humanitarian Aid,” Haaretz, June 27, 2025, ➝.
Matt Spivey and Adam Durbin, “UN Agency Says 6,000 Lorries' Worth of Aid Ready to Enter Gaza and Urges Israel to Allow Access,” BBC News, July 23, 2025, ➝; Malak A Tantesh et al., “‘We Faced Hunger Before, but Never Like This’: Skeletal Children Fill Hospital Wards as Starvation Grips Gaza,” The Guardian, July 23, 2025, ➝.
Tom Bennett, “Head of Controversial Israel-backed Gaza Aid Group Resigns,” BBC News, May 26, 2025, ➝.
Irit Katz, "Lethal Humanitarianism: Why Violence at Gaza Aid Centres Should Not Come as a Surprise,” The Conversation, June 3, 2025, ➝.
The Gaza Humanitarian Islands Plan Interim Phase, IDSF, December 19, 2024, ➝.
Emma Graham-Harrison, “Israeli Plan for Forced Transfer of Gaza’s Population ‘a Blueprint for Crimes Against Humanity’,” The Guardian, July 7, 2025, ➝.
Graham-Harrison, “Israeli Plan for Forced Transfer of Gaza’s Population.”
Graham-Harrison, “Israeli Plan for Forced Transfer of Gaza’s Population.”
Irit Katz, The Common Camp: Architecture of Power and Resistance in Israel–Palestine (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2022).
“‘I Can’t Erase All the Blood from My Mind’: Palestinian Armed Groups’ October 7 Assault on Israel,” Human Rights Watch, July 17, 2024, ➝.
Revival for the TKUMA Region, ➝.
Planning Administration, 2023.
Talia Levy Rosenbaum, בין קרווילות לבית קבוע: כך משקמים את קיבוצי העוטף שנה אחרי, Ynet, October 8, 2024, ➝.
Katz, The Common Camp.
Chen Maanit, “50 Hostages, 659 Days: ‘We Cannot Normalize a Reality Where Hostages Remain in Captivity’,” Haaretz, July 26, 2025, ➝.
Jeremy Bowen, “Bowen: Netanyahu is presiding over a divided Israel - the fault lines are now chasms,” BBC News, August 15, 2025, ➝.
“Court Rejects Nahal Oz Residents’ Petition Against Government Push to Send Them Home” The Times of Israel, August 20, 2025, ➝.
“Far-right Israeli politicians and settlers discuss luxury ‘Gaza riviera’ plan,” The Guardian, July 24, 2025, ➝.
Jason Burke, “The ruin of Gaza: how Israel’s two-year assault has devastated the territory,” The Guardian, October 7, 2025, ➝.
“Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan in full,” BBC News, September 30, 2025, ➝.
“Netanyahu heaps praise on Trump and nominates him for Israel's highest award,” Sky News, October 13, 2025, ➝.
Lucy Williamson, “Israel’s ‘yellow line’ in Gaza gives Netanyahu room for manoeuvre,” BBC News, October 21, 2025, ➝.
